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Investment in human capital generates significant private
returns. Why do governments use public funds to subsidize an
investment that has significant private benefits? In this paper, I
explore the theoretical rationales for public intervention in
education, with a particular focus on human capital externalities.
I also describe the existing empirical evidence on the relevance of
each of these rationales. [JEL Classification: I2]
L’investimento in capitale umano genera rendimenti privati si-
gnificativi. Perché lo Stato sussida un investimento che ha benefi-
ci privati notevoli? In questo articolo, esploro i motivi teorici che
giustificano l’intervento pubblico nel campo dell’istruzione, con at-
tenzione particolare alle esternalità generate dal capitale umano.
Passo poi in rassegna la più recente letteratura empirica sull’argo-
mento.
1. - Introduction
Investment in human capital pays well. The average difference
between the earnings of a college graduate and an high school
graduate is more than 40% in the US and the UK. It is somewhat
lower in continental Europe, but it remains substantial in most
countries. It is even higher in many developing countries. Not
only do workers with more education earn more, but this
difference in earnings is a reflection of education per se and not
a result of selection. In other words, this difference can be
3
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Despite large, well documented private returns to education,
all governments in the world heavily subsidize private investment
in education. In virtually all countries, education is completely free
up to high-school. But even higher education is highly subsidized.
In the United States, the federal government and most state
governments pay for most of the cost of higher education. The
current subsidy of students’ direct costs at major public universities
in the U.S. is around 80% (Heckman, 1999). Private universities
receive substantial funding from the federal government. The
subsidies for the direct cost of college are even higher in Europe.
In some Northern European countries, the subsidy even includes
a stipend for college students. In other words, in these countries
not only does the government subsidizes the direct cost of
schooling (tuition), but it also pays for the opportunity cost of
students’ time.
Why do governments use taxpayer money to subsidize an
investment that has large private benefits? In this paper, I explore
the theoretical rationales for public intervention in education. I
also describe the existing evidence on the empirical relevance of
each of these rationales.
There are two types of rationales for the existence of public
subsidies to education: equity and efficiency. Proponents of an
equity rationale for public intervention in higher education argue
that public spending is fair because market mechanisms do not
always generate a socially desirable allocation of income. Public
expenditures on higher education can then be viewed as a specific
form of in-kind transfer, not unlike other redistributive programs.
The underlying assumption is that, given a certain desirable amount
of redistribution considered “fair” by society, it is better to constrain
the beneficiary to spend the transfer on education rather than allow
the beneficiary to spend it freely on consumption goods.
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1 This evidence is based on the findings in several studies that use arguably
exogenous variation in individual schooling to measure the private return to
schooling. For a recent survey of the literature on the private returns to schooling,
see CARD D. (1999).Even if one is agnostic on the relative merits and
weaknesses of redistribution through public expenditures for
higher education, government intervention may be justified by
efficiency considerations. This argument for public education
hinges upon the notion that education not only rewards the
educated individual, but also creates a variety of benefits that
are shared by society at large. This rationale requires some form
of market failure. In the presence of market failures, the public
return to schooling may exceed the private return to schooling.
There are at least five possible efficiency rationales: (1) human
capital externalities; (2) credit constraints; (3) intergenerational
externalities; (4) effects on future taxes/transfers; (5) risk
sharing.
In this paper, I mostly focus on human capital externalities. I
ask the following question: What is the effect of an increase in the
overall level of human capital on an economy? In the presence of
externalities, the effect of aggregate human capital on aggregate
income is not necessarily the same as the sum of the effects of
individual human capital on individual income. These earnings
externalities can be either positive or negative. On one hand, a large
theoretical literature in both urban economics and macroeconomics
has argued that aggregate human capital has a positive effect on
productivity over and above its private effect-making human capital
spillovers important factors in explaining the economic growth of
cities, regions, and countries. On the other hand, it is in theory
possible that education has little effect on individual productivity,
but it is simply a signal of innate ability. In this case education
generates negative (pecuniary) externalities, and the effect of
increases in aggregate schooling on aggregate earnings is smaller
than the effect of increases in individual schooling on individual
earnings.
The possibility that the social return to human capital differs
from its private return has tremendous practical importance. In
the presence of market failures generated by human capital
externalities, Pigouvian subsidies can be used to increase the
efficiency of individual human capital accumulation decisions. For
example, the magnitude of the social return to education is a
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education.
Of course, not every spillover is necessarily a market failure
that requires government intervention. One can think of many
spillovers that are internalized. For example, an increase in the
number of high skilled workers may generate positive spillovers
that benefit productivity of low skill workers in the same firm,
e.g. Mas and Moretti (2006). One reason for such increase in the
productivity of low skilled workers is the imperfect substitution
between high skill and low skill workers. Another reason is the
presence of learning spillovers, if low skilled workers acquire
better skills in the presence of high skilled workers. In either case,
these within-firm spillovers are likely to be internalized and will
be reflected in higher wages for educated workers.
2. - Human Capital Externalities in Equilibrium
I begin by presenting a simple general equilibrium framework
of perfect competition that includes both standard demand and
supply factors and spillovers from human capital. The framework
identifies the effect of an increase in the relative supply of
educated workers in a city on the productivity, land prices, and
wages of skilled and unskilled workers. The framework is based
on Moretti (2004a), and Moretti (2004b).
2.1 A Simple Model with Technological Externalities
Consider two cities, A and B, and two types of labor, educated
and uneducated. Workers and firms are perfectly mobile. The
market structure is assumed to be perfectly competitive, so that
the profits of firms are assumed to be zero. Assume that there are
two types of goods, a composite good y-nationally traded-and land
h-locally traded. Each city is a competitive economy that produces
y combining skilled and unskilled workers (N1 and N0) and capital:
y = Ag(N0;N1;K).
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model, I allow the productivity of plants in a city to depend on
the aggregate level of human capital in the city, S: A = f(S).
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Cities differ in the amenities that they offer. Workers maximize
utility subject to a budget constraint by choosing quantities of the
composite good and residential land, given the city amenity, v'.
Because the composite good, y, is traded nationally, its price is
the same everywhere and set equal to 1. Variations in the cost of
living between cities depend only on variations in the price of
land, p, which is assumed to be the same for all workers in the
same city, irrespective of the education group. The quantity of land
is fixed. Because of the perfect mobility and perfect competition
assumptions, equilibrium is obtained when workers have equal
utilities in all cities and firms have equal unit costs across cities.
The equilibrium for the simple case of only two cities, A and
B, is described in Graph 1. The upward sloping lines in each panel
represent indifference curves for the two education groups. Indirect
utility of workers belonging to group j, Vj(wj; p; v'), is a function of
the group’s nominal wage, wj, cost of land and the amenity. The
indifference curves are upward sloping because workers prefer high
wages and low rent. Since workers are free to migrate, utility of
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2 What may explains these technological increasing returns? MARSHALL A. (1890)
is the first to argue that social interactions among workers in the same industry and
location create learning opportunities that enhance productivity. Perhaps the most
in uential example is the work by LUCAS R.E. (1988). In that paper, human capital
is assumed to have two effects. First, an individual’s own human capital has the
standard effect of increasing her own productivity. Second, the average aggregate
level of human capital contributes to the productivity of all factors of production.
This second effect is an externality, because “though all benefit from it, no individual
human capital accumulation decision can have an appreciable effect on average
human capital, so no one will take it into account” in deciding how much to invest
in human capital accumulation. In Lucas’ view, human capital externalities may be
large enough to explain long-run income differences between rich and poor countries.
In Lucas’ model the externality is simply built into the production function, but
Lucas goes on to argue that the sharing of knowledge and skills through formal and
informal interaction is the mechanism that generates positive externalities across
workers. More recent models build on this idea by assuming that individuals
augment their human capital through pairwise meetings with more skilled neighbors
at which they exchange ideas. See for example GLAESER E.L. (1999); PERI G. (2002);
JOVANOVIC B. - ROB R. (1989); BLACK D. - HENDERSON V. (1999); ARROW K. (1962);
GRILICHES Z. (1986); JAFFE A. - TRAJTENBERG M. - HENDERSON R. (1993) and SAXENINAN
A. (1994). See GILLES D. - PUGA D. (2003) for a detailed survey of this class of models.workers is equalized across locations: V1(w1; p; v') = k1 and V0(w0;
p; v') = k0 for educated and uneducated workers, respectively. The
downward sloping lines show combinations of wages and rents
which hold constant firms’ unit costs: Cc(w0; w1; p) = 1, where w0
and w1 are wages of uneducated and educated workers, respectively;
and c indexes city. (If production functions vary across cities, for
example because of spillover effects, then the unit cost functions
are city-specific). A zero-profit condition for the firms ensures that
production takes place along the downward sloping curve. Thus the
model has three equations (unit cost and indirect utility for each
skill group) in three unknowns (w0, w1 and p). Point 1 in the left
panel of Graph 1 represents the equilibrium combination of the
educated workers’ wage and the price of land in city A. Point 1 in
the right panel represents the same combination for uneducated
workers.
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GRAPH 1
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Notes: Point 1 is the equilibrium in city A. Point 2 is the equilibrium in city
B without spillover. Point 3 is the equilibrium in city B with spillover. The dashed
line in the right panel is the isocost curve in city B without spillover. w1 and w0
are the nominal wage of educated and uneducated workers, respectively.If the two cities are identical, the equilibrium in city B is the
same. However, there are two ways to make the overall level of
human capital higher in city B than in city A-either by increasing
the relative supply of educated workers in city B, or by increasing
the relative demand for educated workers in city B. I begin by
considering what happens to equilibrium wages when the relative
supply of educated workers is higher in B than in A.
One way of making the relative supply of educated workers
higher in B than in A is to assume that city B has an higher level
of the local amenity than city A (v'B > v'A) and educated workers
value the amenity, while uneducated workers don’t. It is important
to note that, in this general framework, I interpret v' broadly, as
any exogenous factor that increases the relative supply of educated
workers.
As shown in Graph 1, the indifference curve at level k1 of
educated workers in city B is to the left of the corresponding
curve in city A, while the indifference curve for uneducated
workers does not change. In this context, even without
externalities, the wage of the uneducated workers is higher. If
there are no spillovers, the increase in the supply of educated
workers in city B raises the wage of uneducated workers to w' 0
and lowers the wage of educated ones to w' 1 (point 2 in both
panels of Graph 1). This is the standard result. Because of
imperfect substitution, uneducated workers are now more
productive in city B and because of the amenity, educated
workers accept lower wages there.
3
In the presence of spillovers, however, the combinations of
wages and rents that hold firms’ costs constant in city B lies to
the right of the corresponding combination in city A for both
groups (point 3). For educated workers, the shift of the isocost
curve is caused by the spillover only; for uneducated workers the
shift is caused by both complementarity (movement from 1 to 2)
and the spillover (movement from 2 to 3). The distinction between
Private and Social Returns to Education E. MORETTI
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3 For simplicity, I follow ROBACK J. (1988) and take the level of utility k1 and
k0 as parameters for simplicity. Closure of the model would require that the level
of utility is made endogenous. This would complicate the model, without changing
its implications.complementarity and spillovers is important both for theoretical
reasons as well as for policy implications. (Complementarity is
clearly not a market failure). Below, I discuss how it is possible to
empirically distinguish between complementarity and spillovers.
So far I have considered the case where differences in the
relative number of educated workers in city A and city B are driven
by differences in the relative supply. I now turn to the case where
differences in the relative number of educated workers are driven
by differences in the relative demand for educated workers. In
Graph 2 cities are identical in term of amenities, but differ in term
of technology, T. I interpret T broadly, as any exogenous factor
that increases the relative productivity of educated workers and
therefore their relative demand. To make technology differences
more explicit in Graph 2 T appears in the isocost: C(w0; w1; p; T).
(Since cities are identical, the amenity is dropped from the
indifference curves.) Suppose that, because of technological
differences, skilled workers are particularly productive in city B
and demand for them is high. Attracted by higher wages, skilled
workers move to city B. In so doing, they raise average education
there. Point 2 represents the equilibrium in city B if there are no
spillovers. The wage of educated workers is higher because
technology makes them more productive, while the wage of
uneducated workers is higher because of complementarity. In the
presence of spillovers effects, the isocost curve shifts further to
the right. In this case, the true spillover effect is a shift from 2 to
3, but the observed effect is larger, from 1 to 3.
In equilibrium, both skill groups are present in both cities.
Since workers are free to migrate from city A to city B, why are
equilibrium wages-net of the compensating differential-not driven
to equality? In this model, migration to high wage cities leads to
higher rent, making workers indifferent between cities. Although
in equilibrium workers in cities with higher human capital earn
higher nominal wages than workers in cities with low human
capital, in real terms workers in cities with high human capital
are not better off because land is more expensive.
4 A similar
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4 Other models achieve the same result assuming that quality of life is declining
in the size of the city (GLAESER E.L. - SCHEINKMAN J.A. - SHLEIFER A., 1995).intuition holds for firms. Since firms are free to relocate from A
to B, why is productivity not driven to equality? Wages and rent
are higher in city B, making firms indifferent between cities.
Note that in this context, where cities are small open economies
that face a perfectly elastic supply of labor at a fixed utility level,
landowners in cities with high levels of human capital are the only
real beneficiaries of thespillovers. Because land is the only immobile
factor in this model, all the rent generated by the externality in
terms of increased productivity is capitalized in land prices. The
policy implications are not obvious. On one hand, the common US
system of financing public education with local property taxes
seems ecient. Since landowners are the beneficiaries of the spillover,
taxing land may work to internalize the externality. On the other
Private and Social Returns to Education E. MORETTI
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Notes: Point 1 is the equilibrium in city A. Point 2 is the equilibrium in city
B without spillover. Point 3 is the equilibrium in city B with spillover. The dashed
lines in both panels are the isocost curves in city B without spillover. w1 and w0
are the nominal wage of educated and uneducated workers, respectively.hand, workers are mobile and heterogeneous in their tastes, and
localities differ in their amenities. Under these circumstances it is
possible that municipalities that invest heavily in schooling may
retain only some of the benefits. Black and Henderson (1999)
present a theoretical discussion of whether local governments can
successfully internalize human capital externalities.
5 And Bound,
Groen, Kezdi and Turner (forthcoming) undertake an empirical
investigation of the mobility of college graduates and its
implications for local and state education policies.
It is important to realize that the model presented here
assumes that cities are small relative to the whole economy, and
face a perfectly elastic supply of labor at a fixed utility level, so
that technology shocks dont affect the average technology for the
whole economy. If the number of cities is limited and cities are
large relative to the whole economy, conclusions are different,
because general equilibrium effects may arise. For example, if a
large city experience a large technology shock, this will result in
an improvement of the average technology for the whole economy,
and utility levels will in general rise.
2.2 Pecuniary Externalities
The model above is based on technological externalities. A
second group of models explain positive human capital externalities
as pecuniary externalities. Labor market pooling externalities were
first proposed by Marshall (1890). One recent example is a model
where job search is costly, and spillovers from education arise
because of the complementarity between physical and human
capital (Acemoglu, 1996). Because of the complementarity between
physical and human capital, the privately optimal amount of
schooling depends on the amount of physical capital a worker
expects to use. The privately optimal amount of physical capital
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5 BLACK D. - HENDERSON V. (1999) use a dynamic framework that is more
general than the one presented here, because it allows spillovers to affect economic
growth.depends on the education of the workforce. If a group of workers
in a city increases its level of education, firms in that city, expecting
to employ these workers, would invest more in physical capital.
Since search is costly, some of the workers who have not increased
their education would end up working with more physical capital
and hence earn more than similar workers in other cities.
As in Lucas, the presence of skilled workers in a city generates
external benefits for other workers there. Both Lucas and
Acemoglu agree that the average wage of unskilled workers in a
city increases with the average human capital of the labor force.
But what distinguishes Acemoglu’s story from Lucas’ story is that
this result does not follow from assumptions on the production
function, but rather is derived from market interactions. Even
though all the production functions of the economy exhibit
constant returns to scale in Acemoglu, the complementarity of
human capital and physical capital coupled with frictions in the
job search process, generates a positive relationship between
average wage and average human capital, holding constant
workers’ individual human capital.
Although differences across cities in their quantity of
physical capital play a central role in this model, differences in
the quality of physical capital (technology) could arguably
generate similar conclusions. Specifically, if skills and technology
are complementary, it is plausible to assume that the privately
optimal amount of human capital depends not only on the
amount of physical capital a worker expects to use, but also on
the technological level that characterizes such capital. Similarly,
in models with endogenous skill-biased technical change, an
increase in the supply of educated workers increases the size of
the market for skill-complementary technologies and stimulates
the R&D sector to spend more effort upgrading the productivity
of skilled workers (Acemoglu, 1998).
Another reason why the social return to schooling, as
measured in terms of increased aggregate earnings, may differ
from the private return is the presence of negative externalities.
If education functions as a signal of productive ability, rather than
enhancing productivity directly, the private return may exceed the
Private and Social Returns to Education E. MORETTI
13social return. This is a case where people with higher innate ability
signal their higher innate productivity by enduring extra years of
schooling. If schooling is more dicult for individuals with low
innate productivity than individuals with high innate productivity,
then, even if schooling itself is worthless in terms of enhancing
productivity, it still may be a useful screening device for employers
to identify more productive job applicants. This possibility is
important because it implies that one extra year in average
schooling in a city (or state or nation) would result in less than
an 8-12% increase in aggregate earnings.
In the most extreme version of the model, a one-year increase
in average schooling in a city would have no effect on earnings.
Employers would simply increase their hiring standard, and
everyone would end up at the same jobs they would have had
without the increase in education. In this extreme case, the private
return to schooling would be 8-12%, but the social return would
be 0. Although this is certainly possible in theory, this scenario is
unlikely to be relevant in practice. The existing empirical evidence
on private returns to schooling indicates that education has a
causal effect on productivity.
2.3 Econometric Challenges in Estimating Human Capital 
Externalities
The model above predicts that the productivity of firms is
higher in cities with higher overall levels of human capital.
Because workers are more productive, wages are also higher in
cities with higher overall levels of human capital. But for this to
be an equilibrium, land prices must adjust to make workers and
firms indifferent. A useful implication of this model is that there
are three possible empirical strategies to identify the magnitude
of human capital spillovers. We can compare productivity, wages
or land prices between cities.
Using the first metric, the magnitude of the spillover can be
identified by taking the difference in the unit cost functions in
city A, the city with low levels of human capital, and city B, the
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14city with high levels of human capital, holding constant the price
of factors:
(1) ln c(w0A;w1A; p; SA) – ln c(w0A;w1A; p; SB)
If there are spillovers, unit costs are lower in city B than in
city A, holding constant wages and land prices.
6 Although
appealing in theory, an estimation strategy based on the
comparison of unit costs across cities like the one suggested by
Equation 1 is hard to implement in practice because of data
limitations. Large scale datasets with information on production
costs for many firms in many cities are hard to obtain.
On the other hand, data on inputs and output are more readily
available. So, instead of identifying spillovers by comparing unit
costs of otherwise identical plants located in cities with high and
low levels of human capital and holding input prices fixed, one
can more easily identify spillovers by comparing the output of
otherwise identical plants located in cities with high and low levels
of human capital, holding input quantities fixed. In the notation
of the simple example in the previous section, spillovers can be
measured by taking the difference in the production functions of
city B and city A, holding labor and capital constant:
(2) ln[f(SA)g(N0;N1;K)] – ln[f(SB)g(N0;N1;K)] = ln f(SA) – ln f(SB)
The second option is to measure the magnitude of the
spillovers in term of land prices. The model in the previous section
shows that the spillover is capitalized in land prices. If data on
property values in different cities are available, estimates of the
spillovers can be obtained by simply measuring differences in land
prices between cities with high levels of human capital and cities
with low levels of human capital. In terms of the example in the
previous section, the magnitude of the spillover is simply the
Private and Social Returns to Education E. MORETTI
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6 Note that I now write the cost function c as a function of human capital in
the city. This reduced form representation of the cost function captures the idea
that in cities with higher human capital, total factor productivity is higher, so the
same amount of output can be produced with less inputs.difference in housing prices between city B and city A: (pB – p').
Graphically, this is the difference in rent between point 2 and point
3 in Graph 1 or Graph 2.
Two caveats need to be considered. First, the model assumes
that land is fixed, which may not be always true. Second, there
is the issue of how to empirically measure (pB – p'). Because data
on land prices are dicult to obtain, researchers often rely on
housing prices (adjusted for housing characteristics), which are
readily available for most large cities (for example in the Census
of Population and Housing). One limitation of using housing
prices is that the stock of housing is not necessarily fixed.
Finally, one can use wages to measure spillovers. Most of the
existing empirical studies that attempt to quantify the magnitude
of human capital spillovers have focused on wages. In theory, one
might think of using the difference in the wage of educated
workers, (w1B – w'1), or the difference in the wage of uneducated
workers (w0B – w'0) in the two cities, or a weighted average of the
two:
Graphically, the difference in the wage of educated workers is the
distance between point 2 and point 3 in the left panel of Graph
1 or 2 and the difference in the wage of uneducated workers is
the distance between point 2 and point 3 in the right panel of
Graph 1 or 2.
Three points are important here. First, nominal wages should
be used in the empirical analysis. Wages adjusted for cost of living
are not the correct dependent variable. The reason is that higher
nominal wages in a city imply greater productivity. If workers
weren’t more productive, firms producing goods that are traded
nationally (such as manufacturing goods) would leave high-wage
cities and relocate to low-wage cities. Some workers are employed
in industries that produce output that is not traded nationally (for
example, local services). But firms producing traded goods face
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16the same price everywhere in the nation, so that, as long as there
are some firms producing traded goods in every city, average
productivity has to be higher in cities where nominal wages are
higher (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000).
Second, it is important to recognize that wage changes affecting
workers in a city not only capture human capital spillovers, but also
capture the complementarity (or imperfect substitutability) between
skilled and unskilled workers. If skilled and unskilled workers are
imperfect substitutes, unskilled workers benefit from an increase in
the number of skilled workers even in the absence of any externality.
Therefore, the average effect on wages, 
reflects both the spillover effect and imperfect substitution between
high and low education workers. The distinction is important,
because, unlike human capital externalities, complementarity is not
a market failure. In section 2.4, I formally show the difference
between complementarity and spillovers and I suggests two ways
to empirically separate the two.
Third, even controlling for the complementarity effect, the
difference in wages between cities with high and low human
capital is not exactly equal to the spillover, because land prices
also adjust. Only in the case where no land is used in commercial
production will the wage difference between cities with high and
low human capital equal the spillover.
The discussion so far has ignored the possible presence of
confounding factors that may introduce spurious correlation in
the relationship between wages (or productivity or land prices)
and aggregate human capital. There are many unobserved
characteristics of workers and cities that affect wages and at the
same time may be correlated with the overall level of human
capital. A goal of the model is to identify potential sources of
unobserved heterogeneity that might bias empirical estimates of
the human capital spillover.
In the stylized framework developed above, unobserved
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17heterogeneity is of two types: demand shocks that affect the
relative productivity of workers with high human capital in a city;
and supply shocks, that affect the relative attractiveness of a city
for high human capital workers. As mentioned above, these
demand and supply shocks need to be interpreted broadly, as any
factor that affects the relative demand or supply of skilled workers
and that is unmeasured by the econometrician.
In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated
with aggregate human capital, OLS regressions of wages on
aggregate human capital can be biased upward or downward
depending on the relative magnitude of unobserved demand and
supply heterogeneity. To see this, consider first Graph 1, where
variation in the relative number of educated workers across cities
is driven by supply factors. To the extent that the amenity that
attracts skilled workers to city B is not observed, this unobserved
heterogeneity biases the OLS coecient in a regression of wages of
educated workers on share of educated workers downward. In
Graph 1 (left panel), the true spillover is the difference between
the wage at point 3 and the wage at point 2. The observed effect
is instead the difference between the wage in point 3 and the wage
in point 1, which is smaller than the true spillover. The intuition
is straightforward. The compensating differential that skilled
workers implicitly pay for the amenity is unobserved, and enters
the wage of skilled workers as a negative city-specific residual. The
correlation between this residual and average education is negative,
as skilled workers trade some of their wage for the amenity, so
that the OLS coecient on average education is biased down.
The opposite bias arises from heterogeneity in relative labor
demand. Consider Graph 2. The size of the spillover is the size of
the shift from 2 to 3. But if T is unobserved, the OLS coecient in
a regression of wages of educated workers on share of educated
workers assigns all of the observed correlation between wages and
average education to the spillover, and yields an estimate of the
spillover that is upward biased (the size of the shift from 1 to 3).
Again, the intuition is clear. A positive unobserved shock to the
demand of skilled workers implies a wage equation residual that
is positively correlated with the overall level of human capital.
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or smaller than the OLS estimate depends on whether supply
heterogeneity dominates demand heterogeneity.
In the case of land, the bias is unambiguously positive. The
reason is that the compensating differential paid for the amenity
in term of housing prices raises prices in city B with respect to
city A. In Graph 1, the true spillover is the difference between the
rent at point 3 and the rent at point 2. The observed effect is
instead the difference between the rent at point 3 and the rent at
point 1, which is smaller than the true spillover.
2.4 Imperfect Substitution Between Educated and Non-Educated
Workers
Increases in the aggregate level of human capital in a city have
two distinct effects on the wage distribution. First, the standard
neoclassical model with imperfect substitution between educated
and uneducated workers indicates that an increase in the number
of the educated will lower the wage of the educated and raise the
wage of uneducated workers. Second, human capital spillovers will
raise the wage of both groups (Moretti (forthcoming)).
Under the assumption of complementarity (imperfect substi-
tutability) between educated and uneducated workers, an increase
in the relative number of college graduates is unambiguously
positive for the wage of unskilled workers, while for college
graduates its sign depends on the size of the spillover. Intuitively,
complementarity and spillover both increase wages of uneducated
workers, while the impact of an increase in the supply of educated
workers on their own wage is determined by two competing forces:
the first is the conventional supply effect which makes the
economy move along a downward sloping demand curve; the sec-
ond is the spillover that raises productivity. If the spillover is strong
enough, as in Graph 1, the equilibrium wage of educated workers
in city B is higher than in city A.
7
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7  Empirical evidence confirms that educated and uneducated workers are
imperfect substitutes; see, for example, KATZ L.F. - MURPHY K.M. (1992).To see this point in more detail, assume that the technology
is Cobb-Douglas:




where the θ’s are productivity shifters. As before, I allow for
human capital spillovers by letting workers’ productivity depend
on the share of educated workers in the city, as well as on their
own human capital:
(4)
where φj is a group-specific effect that captures the direct effect
of own human capital on productivity (φ1 > φ0);
is share of college educated workers in the city. If γ = 0, the model
is the standard Mincerian model of wage determination without
spillovers. If there are positive spillovers, γ > 0. If wages are equal
to the marginal product of each type of labor and the spillover is
external to individual firms in the city but internal to the city as
a whole (so that firms take the θ’s as given), the logarithm of
wages for educated and uneducated workers respectively are:
log(w1) = log(α1) + α1log(θ1) + (1 – α1 – α0)log(K=N) + (α1 – 1)log(s)
+  α0log(θ0(1 – s)) and log(w0) = log(α0) + α0log(θ0) + (1 – α1 –
α0)log(K=N) + (α0 – 1)log(1 – s) + α1log(θ1s), where N = N0 + N1.
Consider what happens to the wages when the share of educated
workers increases in the city:
(5)
(6)
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20The wage of uneducated workers, w0, benefits for two reasons.
First, an increase in the number of educated workers raises
uneducated workers’ productivity because of imperfect substitution:
Second, the spillover further raises their productivity: (α1+α0) γ >
0. The impact of an increase in the supply of educated workers on
their own wage, w1, is determined by two competing forces, as I
mentioned above: the first is the conventional supply effect which
makes the economy move along a downward sloping demand
curve:
The second is the spillover that raises productivity.
The important feature of equations (5)  and  (6) is that
unskilled workers benefit from an increase in the share of
educated workers in the city even in the absence of any spillovers
(γ = 0), but the effect on the wage of skilled workers depends on
the magnitude of the spillover. If γ is large enough, the net effect
for skilled workers should be positive although smaller than for
unskilled workers. If γ = 0, the net effect should be negative.
It is interesting to notice that an increase in the number of
educated workers in a city may raise the average wage above the
private return to schooling even in the absence of any spillovers
(γ = 0). To see this, take the derivative of average wage with respect
to s minus the private return β:
(7)
where log(w –) is the weighted average of log wages of the two
groups, log(w –) = slog(w1) + (1 – s)log(w0); and β is the private return,
defined as the difference between the wage of educated and
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21uneducated workers β = log(w1) – log(w0). The first component in
equation (7) is the effect of an increase of educated workers on the
private return to education. This effect is negative, because as the
supply of educated workers in a city increases, the private return
decreases. The second effect captures the imperfect substitution
between educated and uneducated workers, and is positive. The
third effect reflects the spillover. In the US, the share of college
educated workers, s, is approximately 0.25. Therefore, the sum of
the first two components,
is positive if the share of output that goes to college educated
workers is more than a third of the share of output that goes to
less educated workers: α1 > 0.33α0. In this case, the increase in
productivity for low education workers more than offsets the effect
of the decrease in the private return to education and an increase
in s raises average wages over and above the private return to
schooling even in the absence of spillovers.
The distinction between imperfect substitutability and
spillovers is important for the interpretation of empirical
estimates. Finding that average wages are affected by aggregate
human capital does not necessarily indicate a spillover effect:
rather this finding may indicate imperfect substitution between
high and low educated workers. This distinction is relevant not
only for theoretical reasons, but also for policy reasons. The
standard imperfect substitution effect is not itself a market failure.
However, if human capital spillovers exist, a market failure may
occur. This depends on whether the spillover takes place within
or outside the firm. It is in theory possible that within-firm
spillovers are reflected in the wages of educated workers, so that
no market failure arises. If the spillover has effects outside the
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8 One can think of the “imperfect substitutability effect” as a form of pecuniary
externality. However, this type of pecuniary externality is very different from the
pecuniary externalities proposed by Acemoglu that I discussed in Section 2.If the spillover effect is not constant across groups (γj instead
of  γ), it is not empirically possible to separately identify
externalities and imperfect substitutability. However, under the
assumption that the spillover effect is constant across education
groups, there are two ways to empirically distinguish between
imperfect substitutability and externalities. First, one can estimate
separate effects of changes in the fraction of highly-educated
workers on wages of different education groups (for example,
Moretti, forthcoming). By comparing the effect of an increase in
the share of college graduates across education groups, it is in
theory possible to shed some light on the size of the spillover.
Standard demand and supply considerations suggest that the
effect of an increase in college share should be positive for low
education groups and that for college graduates its sign should
depend on the size of the spillover. If the spillover is strong
enough, the effect for skilled workers is positive although lower
than the one for unskilled workers.
Second, Ciccone and Peri (2002) propose an alternative
approach — called the “constant-composition approach” — to
estimate human capital externalities when highly educated
workers and less educated workers are imperfect substitutes. They
propose estimating the effect of average schooling on average
wages across cities, holding the relative size of each skill group
constant through a re-weighting scheme. This is obtained by first
estimating a city-year-education group specific conditional average
wage, and then regressing these cell averages on average
schooling, weighting the regression by the size of the group in a
base year. The intuition is that weighting makes it possible to
separate complementarity from spillovers by holding the skill
distribution of the labor force in the city constant.
3. - Empirical Estimates of Human Capital Externalities
Most of the direct evidence on the magnitude of the spillovers
is based on models that regress wage on measures of the aggregate
stock of human capital. The basic source of identification
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23therefore consists of the comparison of wages for otherwise
similar individuals who work in cities with different aggregate
human capital. Typically, authors have estimated variations of the
following equation
(8) log(wict) = Xitβct + πPct + αZct + dc + dt + uict
where wict is wage of individual i living in city c in period t; Xit
is a vector of individual characteristics, including years of
schooling; Pct represents a measure of aggregate human capital in
city c in year t; Zct is a vector of city characteristics which may
be correlated with Pct; dc represents a city fixed effect; and dt is a
year effect.
The coefficient of interest is π, which is the estimate of the
effect of aggregate human capital on average wages after controlling
for the private return to education. Typically, authors have measured
aggregate human capital in a city, Pct, using either average years of
schooling or the percent of individuals with a college education.
Ciccone and Peri (2002) show the conditions under which equation
(8) can be derived from the standard framework used in theoretical
macro economics to model the effect of human capital on economic
growth at the aggregate level (see for example, Lucas, 1988 or Bils
and Klenow, 2000).
The wage equation residual can be thought as the sum of
three components:
(9) uict = µcθi + vct + εict
where  θi is a permanent unobservable component of individual
human capital, such as ability or family background; µc is a factor
loading which represents the return to unobserved skill in city c;
vct represents time-varying shocks to labor demand and supply in
city  c in period t;  εict is the transitory component of log wages
which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed
over individuals, cities and time.
A first source of omitted variable bias is the presence of time-
varying shocks to local labor markets that are correlated with
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location, industrial structure, technology, weather and amenities.
City fixed effects sweep out the effect of permanent city
characteristics such as the industrial structure and physical and
cultural amenities that might bias a simpler cross-sectional
analysis. But first-differenced models may still be biased by the
presence of time-varying factors that are correlated with changes
in human capital and wages across cities|for example, transitory
productivity shocks that attract highly educated workers and raise
wages: cov(vct; Sct) ≠ 0. The resulting OLS bias is positive (negative)
if positive shocks to wages are associated with increases
(decreases) in the human capital stock in a city. For example, the
San Jose economy experienced an unprecedented economic
expansion starting in the second half of the 1980s that was driven
by the Silicon Valley computer industry boom. The same boom
attracted a highly educated labor force to San Jose. On the other
hand, if variation in human capital stock across cities is driven
by unobserved supply factors, OLS is biased downward.
A second source of omitted variable bias is the presence of
unobserved worker characteristics if individuals observed in cities
with high human capital are better workers than individuals with
the same observable characteristics who live in cities with low
human capital. In terms of equation (8), this implies that cov(θi;
Pct) > 0. For example, a high-school graduate working in a
biotechnology firm in San Francisco is probably different along
some unobservable dimension from a high-school graduate
working in a shoe factory in Miami. Similarly, a lawyer working
for a Wall-Street firm in New York is likely to differ from a lawyer
in El Paso, TX. This type of sorting may take place if a higher
overall level of human capital in a city is associated with a higher
return to unobserved ability, causing higher quality workers to
move to cities with higher college share (Borjas, Bronars and Trejo
1992; Rauch, 1993). Consider a simple Roy model where different
cities reward workers’ skills — both observed and unobserved —
differently, and mobility decisions are based on comparative
advantage. In such a model, workers are not randomly assigned
to cities, but choose the city where their skills are most valued
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migratory ows. Cities that have an industrial structure that
demands more education are also likely to offer a higher price for
unobserved ability. In this case, the correlation of high Pct with
high wages may simply reflect higher unobserved ability of
workers rather than higher productivity.
In an ideal analysis, the researcher could randomly assign
different overall levels of human capital across cities and measure
differences in the value of wages before sorting occurs. This
experimental design would solve the identification problem. (Note,
however, that the experimental design would not solve the problem
of distinguishing between complementarity and externalities
discussed in section 2.4). In its absence, three strategies can be
used to account for endogeneity of overall levels of human capital.
First, some authors have tried accounting for time-varying
shocks by controlling for observable characteristics of cities, such
as racial composition or unemployment rate. It is particularly
important to fully control for shocks to the relative demand for
skilled labor, as they lead to overestimates of the spillover. In an
effort to accomplish this goal, some researchers have used an
index of demand shifts proposed by Katz and Murphy (1992). The
index, a generalization of a widely used measure of between-sector
demand shifts, is based on nationwide employment growth in
industries, weighted by the city-specific employment share in
those industries. It captures exogenous shifts in the relative
demand for different education groups that are predicted by the
city industry mix. See for example, Moretti (forthcoming).
One limitation of this approach is that it is hard to argue
persuasively that observables can fully account for shocks. For this
reason, some studies have turned to instrumental variable
techniques. This approach requires an instrument that is correlated
with changes in the overall level of human capital in a city and
uncorrelated with changes in unobserved factors that affect wages
directly. Examples of instrumental variable used are compulsory
schooling laws, child labor laws, the entry of the baby boom cohort
into the labor market, and the presence of land grant colleges. The
advantage of instrumental variable techniques is that a valid
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MAGGIO-GIUGNO 2006
26instrument isolates the effect of exogenous changes in human
capital levels on wages. The disadvantages are that valid, exogenous
instruments are rare. Furthermore, if the effect of overall human
capital on wages is not homogeneous, IV estimates and OLS
estimates may not be directly comparable.
As a third possible identification strategy, individual-level
longitudinal data have been used. By observing the same individual
over time, one can control for factors that make an individual
permanently more productive. But note that if longitudinal data
on multiple individuals and cities are available, individual fixed
effects models are not the most general model that can be estimated.
In particular, the term µcθi in equation (8) can be absorbed by
including a set of individualcity dummies. By controlling for the
individual−city match, variation that comes from movers is lost.
Identification is based on stayers and comes from changes of P
in a city over time. Conditional on a city-individual match, the
longitudinal model estimates what happens to an individual’s wage
as aggregate human capital around her increases. The key
identifying assumption is that the return to unobserved ability µc
may vary across cities, but not over time or, if it does change over
time, the change is not systematically correlated with the stock of
human capital. Under this assumption, differences in the level of
unobserved ability and in return to unobserved ability across cities
are absorbed by individualcity fixed effects. One limitation of this
longitudinal strategy is that stayers are not necessarily a random
sample of the population. If stayers are different from other
workers, longitudinal estimates may be biased.
3.1 Factor Price Models
I now turn to a discussion of some of the empirical evidence
on the magnitude of human capital externalities generated by
wage models. What do we know about the magnitude of human
capital spillovers? Researchers have only recently begun to
estimate the size of spillovers from education by comparing the
wages of otherwise similar individuals in cities or states with
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have used variants of the wage equations in equation (8).
Rauch (1993) often cited study is the first to exploit
differences in human capital across cities to identify externalities.
Using the 1980 Census, he estimates a cross sectional version of
equation  (8) and finds that a one year increase in average
education raises wages by 3 to 5 percent in 1980. Rauch is also
one of the very few researchers to examine the effect of human
capital on the cost of housing. He finds that the cost of housing
is higher in cities with a larger stock of human capital (holding
constant housing characteristics), and concludes that spillover
appear to be capitalized in land prices. A limitation of Rauch’s
methodology is that he does not directly account for the
endogeneity of aggregate human capital. Rauch uses only one
cross section and treats average schooling as historically
predetermined. A second limitation is that he does not distinguish
between externalities and complementarity between skilled and
unskilled workers.
Moretti (forthcoming) attempts to address the endogeneity
created by city wide demand shocks using two instrumental
variables. The first instrument is based on differences in the age
structure of cities. The US labor force is characterized by a long-
run trend of increasing education, with younger cohorts better-
educated than older ones. The second instrument used is an
indicator for the presence of a land-grant college in the city. Land-
grant colleges were established by the federal Morrill Act of 1862.
9
He also tries to account for unobserved individual ability by
exploiting the panel structure of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) to estimate models that condition on
individual×city effects.
Moretti finds that a one percentage point increase in college
share in a city raises average wages by 0.6%-1.2%, above and
beyond the private return to education. As argued in previous
sections, the finding that average wages are affected by the
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9 Because the program was federal and took place more than one hundred
years ago, the presence of a land-grant institution is unlikely to be correlated with
local labor market conditions in the 1980s.percentage of college graduates in the labor force does not
necessarily indicate a spillover effect: rather this finding may
indicate imperfect substitution between high and low education
workers. For this reason, Moretti estimates the effect of changes
in the fraction of highly educated workers on wages of different
education groups. He finds that a one percentage point increase
in the labor force share of college graduates increases the wages
of high-school drop-outs and high-school graduates by 1.9% and
1.6%, respectively. It also increases wages of college graduates by
0.4%. This findings are consistent with a model that includes both
conventional demand and supply factors as well as spillovers: as
expected, an increase in the proportion of better-educated workers
has a large positive effect on less-educated workers, and a smaller
but still positive effect on the wages of the best-educated group.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use state variation in child labor
and compulsory school attendance laws to instrument for average
schooling. They show that within state changes in these laws affect
the education distribution at the “right” point, by increasing the
probability of high school graduation but not college graduation.
Unlike Rauch (1993) and Moretti (2004a), Acemoglu and Angrist
(2000) also address the endogeneity of individual schooling. They
point out that inconsistent estimates of the private return to
education will lead to inconsistent estimates of the externality,
because individual and aggregate schooling are correlated.
To account for the endogeneity of individual schooling, they
use quarter of birth as an instrumental variable. While their OLS
estimates of the externality are qualitatively consistent with
Rauch’s and Moretti’s OLS estimates, their IV estimates are
smaller and in most cases not significantly different from zero.
The difference in findings between Acemoglu and Angrist
(2000) and Moretti can be explained in part by the fact that child
labor and compulsory attendance laws affect educational
attainment in the lower part of the educational distribution,
mostly in middle school or high school. On the contrary, Moretti
identifies externalities using variation in the number of college
graduates, i.e. the upper part of the distribution. It appears that
a one year rise in a city’s average education resulting from an
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different effect than a similar increase resulting from an increase
in the number of those who go to college. A second factor that
may account for the difference in estimates is the fact that
Acemoglu and Angrist’s analysis is at the state level. When Moretti
estimates state-level spillovers, he finds coecients closer to those
of Acemoglu and Angrist.
10
Ciccone and Peri (2002) propose a new econometric approach
— the “constant-composition approach” — to estimate human
capital externalities when highly educated workers and less
educated workers are imperfect substitutes. This new approach is
a generalization of the approach based on Mincer wage equations
like equation 8, and is to date the most comprehensive attempt
to distinguish between complementarity and externalities. The
constant-composition approach consists of estimating the effect of
average schooling on average wages across cities, holding the
relative size of each skill group constant with a re-weighting
scheme. The weights are based on the size of each skill group in
a base year.
While the re-weighting procedure accounts for the possibility
of complementarity between skilled and unskilled workers,
Ciccone and Peri (2002) also use a set of instrumental variables
to account for the endogeneity of aggregate human capital. When
they constrain highly-educated workers and less educated workers
to be perfect substitutes, Ciccone and Peri (2002) find significant
positive externalities, with magnitudes consistent with estimates
in Rauch and Moretti. However, when they allow for imperfect
substitutability, they find little evidence of positive human capital
spillovers.
In a related paper, Peri (2002) models the location decisions
of young and old workers as a function of human capital
externalities. Using Census data, he begins by showing that the
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10 A third difference concerns the period under consideration. Most models in
ACEMOGLU D. - ANGRIST J. (2000) are estimated using 1960-1980 Census data. When
they add data from the 1990 Census, they find statistically significant positive
estimates for the externality, when child labor laws are used as instruments. Since
the private return to education increased during the 1980’s, this finding may reflect
a change in the social value of human capital.experience premium is higher in urban areas than in rural areas.
For example, in 1990 a college educated urban white male received
a $2 hourly premium over the wage of a similar non-urban worker.
The premium for a mature white worker was twice as large. This
result indicates that young educated workers receive a lower wage
premium in urban areas than their older colleagues, but in spite
of this, they are overrepresented in urban areas. Why do urban
areas attracts young educated workers? Peri argues that learning
externalities are an important explanation. Workers learn from
each other when they are young, so living in dense urban areas
may raise human capital accumulation more than living in a rural
area. The negative compensating differential indicates that young
workers value such human capital externalities. As they grow
older, the importance of knowledge spillovers diminishes, and
some of them move toward non-urban areas.
11
3.2 TFP Models
Having analyzed the empirical evidence based on differences
in wages and land prices across cities, I now turn to evidence
based on differences in productivity levels. The model above
indicates that if externalities exist, we should find that firms
located in cities with high levels of human capital produce more
output with the same inputs than otherwise similar firms located
in cities with low levels of human capital. Furthermore, the model
indicates that these differences between cities should coincide with
observed differences in wages of workers and land prices.
In equilibrium, if firms really are more productive in cities
with high levels of human capital, we would expect to find that
these firms incur higher labor and land costs. If this was not the
case, firms (at least those producing nationally traded goods)
would relocate from cities with low human capital to cities with
high human capital.
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11 The evidence in DORA D. - KAHN M. (2000) offers an alternative to the
learning story.To see how spillovers can be identified by comparing the
productivity of firms in cities with different level of human capital,
assume that technology can be described by the following Cobb-
Douglas production function (Moretti, 2004a):
(10)
where ypjct is output of firm p, belonging to industry j, in city c,
and year t; j indexes industry; L1pjct is the number of hours worked
by skilled workers in the firm; L2pjct is the number of hours worked
by unskilled workers; Kpjct is capital. As before, assume that Apjct
is a function of aggregate human capital outside the firm in the
same city and unobservable productivity shocks:
(11) lnApjct = γS
–
ct + εpjct 
where S
–
ct is some measure of the overall stock of human capital
among all workers in city c at time t; and ε represent unobserved
heterogeneity in productivity. The coecient of interest is γ, the
external effect of education on productivity. If γ = 0, the model
reduces to a standard production function without externalities.
Empirically, the production function (10)  can be either
estimated directly or estimated using its total factor productivity
(TFP) version. The TFP version can be estimated in two steps.
Under the assumption that input prices are equal to their marginal
product, a plant-specific measure of TFP is easily calculated by
subtracting the sum of each input cost share multiplied by the
quantity of that input, from the value of the output. This estimate
of TFP can then be regressed on aggregate human capital.
Like for wage models, the main concern is that there may be
unobservable productivity shocks that are potentially correlated
with aggregate human capital. For example, ε may reflect
unmeasured firm characteristics such as the quality of machines,
patents, the quality of workers and management, and the culture
within the firm. Alternatively,  may capture city characteristics
that make some cities more productive than others. These may
   







RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MAGGIO-GIUGNO 2006
32include the public infrastructure (ports, highways, or airports),
weather conditions, the presence of a research universities, and
efficiency of local authorities.
In general, if plants with a positive  tend to be located in cities
with a high overall level of human capital, then OLS estimates of
overestimate γ.
12
Empirical evidence suggests that knowledge spillovers may be
particularly important in certain hi-tech industries. One interesting
piece of evidence on knowledge externalities is a well-cited paper
by Jaffe et al. (1993) that shows that references to existing patents
that inventors include in their patent applications are likely to come
from the same state or metropolitan area as the originating patent
application. Because human capital spillovers and knowledge
spillovers are invisible, most empirical studies resort to indirect
evidence to test for the presence of spillovers. The studies based
on wage equations described in the previous section test indirect
implications of the spillover hypothesis, rather than directly
measuring the spillover itself. But Jaffe et al. (1993) argue that
patent citations offer a direct measure of spillovers, an observable
paper trail in the form of citations in patents. Jaffe et al. (1993)
use citation patterns to test the extent to which spillovers are
geographically localized. Because patents are publicly available, in
the absence of localized spillovers, citations would not depend on
the location of the inventor.
The key empirical challenge of the paper is to distinguish
between geographic patterns of patent citations caused by
spillovers from patterns caused by exogenous sources of
agglomeration effects. To address this issue, the authors construct
“control” samples of patents that have the same temporal and
technological distribution as the patent citations. To identify the
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12 A similar point is made graphically in Graph 2. This is the case, for example,
if unusually productive entrepreneurs are more likely to seek out productive
locations; or if unusually skilled individuals are disproportionately recruited to the
most productive locations. The true spillover is the difference in productivity between
a plant in point 3 and a plant in point 2. But if the technology that raises productivity
of educated workers in city B relative to city A is unobserved to the econometrician,
a naive estimate of the spillover is the difference in productivity between a plant in
point 3 and a plant in point 1, which overestimates the true spillover.presence of externalities, they compare these two patterns of
geographic concentration under the assumption that the
geographic correlation between the controls and originating
patents is only due to exogenous agglomeration forces that are
independent of spillovers. The proposed test of localization is
whether the correlation is significantly greater for the cited patents
than the control patents. Their findings suggest that patents
citations are indeed geographically localized and that knowledge
spillovers appear to be large.
Adams and Jaffe (1996) also study the composition of the
knowledge transfers within and across firms. They use a TFP
framework that is related to the one presented above but instead
of using the stock of human capital as their main independent
variable, they focus on R&D performed in formal research labs. In
particular, they postulate that a plant has an “effective stock of
knowledge” that is generated in several ways: by learning-by-doing
at this and other plants in the same city or industry, by informal
research activities performed at the plant, by formal research of the
plant’s parent firm, and by formal research of other firms in the
same city or industry. Empirically, they use manufacturing plant-
level data to examine the productivity effects of R&D performed in
a plant, outside a plant but inside the parent firm that owns the
plant, and in external plants in the same geographical area or
industry. They find that spillovers of R&D are important, both
within and across firms-a result that is consistent with the notion
that the social return to research is higher than the private return.
Interestingly, they find that the effect of parent firm R&D on
plant-level productivity is diminished by both the geographical
distance and the technological distance between the research lab
and the plants. They interpret this finding as a reflection of the
fact that communications costs rise with distance. They also
provide evidence of within-industry spillover effects: R&D of other
firms in the same industry does appear to affect a plant’s
productivity, holding industry constant. The magnitude of these
spillovers is surprisingly large. The marginal product of industry
R&D is approximately 40% as large as the marginal product of
parent firm research.
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capital spillovers on the productivity of high tech firms is a recent
paper by Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998). They argue that
geographic differences in specialized human capital across cities
is the main determinant of where and when American
biotechnology industries developed. In particular, they show that
the stock of human capital of outstanding scientists in certain
cities — measured in terms of the number of publications
reporting genetic-sequence discoveries in academic journals —
plays a key role in the entry decisions of new biotech firms. This
effect seems to reflect, at least in part, human capital externalities,
because it is not just a reflection of the presence of universities
and government research centers in areas where outstanding
scientists are located.
13
The studies described so far focus on high-tech industries.
Moretti (2004a) attempts to systematically assess the magnitude
of human capital externalities in all industries by estimating pro-
duction functions similar to those in equation (10). Using longi-
tudinal data, he estimates establishment-level production func-
tions controlling for establishment-specific permanent hetero-
geneity, as well as time-varying industry-specific and state-specif-
ic heterogeneity. Moretti finds that productivity gains from human
capital spillovers appear to be empirically relevant for manufac-
turing establishments in US cities. However, because the stock of
human capital grows slowly over time, the contribution of human
capital spillovers to economic growth does not appear to be large.
Estimates in the paper indicate that human capital spillovers were
responsible for an average of 0.1% increase in output per year
during the 1980s.
14 Most of the estimated spillover comes from
high-tech plants. For non high-tech producers, the spillover ap-
pears to be virtually zero.
Private and Social Returns to Education E. MORETTI
35
13 AUDRETSCH D. - STEPHAN P. (1996) use data on IPO of biotech firms to link
the location of the biotechnology firm with the location of the university-based
scientists aliated with the firm. They conclude that “while proximity matters in
establishing formal ties between university-based scientists and companies, its
influence is anything but overwhelming”.
14 For the average manufacturing plant in the U.S., this amounts to about
$10,000 per year.Importantly, the magnitude of spillovers between plants in the
same city appear to depend on their level of interaction. If input-
output tables are used to measure the interaction between plants
in the same city, spillovers between plants that often interact are
found to be significant, while spillovers between plants that rarely
interact are much smaller. This is consistent with the notion that
human capital spillovers decay not only with geographic distance,
but also with economic distance.
Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model
presented above, the productivity gains generated by human capital
spillover appear to be offset by increased labor costs. Findings
indicate that the estimated productivity differences between cities
with high human capital and low human capital coincide with
observed differences in wages of manufacturing workers.
4. - Other Social Benefits of Education: Crime and Voting
Reduced Criminal Activity
Besides its effects on productivity and earnings, human capital
may also reduce the probability that an individual engage in
socially costly activities, such as crime. Crime is a negative
externality with enormous social costs. If education reduces crime,
then schooling will have social benefits that are not taken into
account by individuals, and most of this benefit is likely to be
realized at the local level: cities with high levels of education
would have lower crime rates. Given the large social costs of
crime, even small reductions in crime associated with education
may be economically important.
There are a number of reasons to believe that education can
reduce criminal activity. First, schooling increases the returns to
legitimate work, raising the opportunity costs of illegal behavior.
Additionally, punishment for criminal behavior often entails
incarceration. By raising wage rates, schooling makes any time
spent out of the labor market more costly.
Second, schooling may directly affect the psychic rewards
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benefits of education, argues that
«Like everything else interesting about human beings, preferences
are a mixture of hereditary and environment. Schools must surely
have a major part, if only because they occupy a large part of a child’s
day. It is a traditional view that not only does education influence
values but it ought to do so».
Third, schooling may alter preferences in indirect ways, which
may in turn affect decisions to engage in crime. For example,
education may increase one’s patience (as in Becker and Mulligan,
1997) or risk aversion. A lower discount rate or higher risk
aversion will reduce the probability that an individual will engage
in criminal activities.
Finally, it is possible that criminal behavior is characterized
by strong state dependence, so that the probability of committing
crime today depends on the amount of crime committed yesterday.
Models incorporating state dependence suggest that those who stay
in school are less likely to be delinquent later in life than those
who drop out. Since school keeps kids off the street and occupied
during the day, in the presence of state dependence, school
attendance may have long-lasting effects on criminal participation.
Witte (1997) argues that based on the existing empirical studies
«...neither years of schooling completed nor receipt of a high school
degree has a significant effect on an individual’s level of criminal
activity». But, this conclusion is based on only a few of the available
studies, including Tauchen et al. (1994) and Witte and Tauchen
(1994), which find no significant link between education and crime
after controlling for a number of individual characteristics. While
Grogger (1998) estimates a significant negative relationship between
wage rates and crime, he finds no relationship between education
and crime after controlling for wages. (Of course, increased wages
are an important consequence of schooling).
15
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15 FREEMAN R. (1996); GOULD E. et AL. (2000); GROGGER J. (1998); MACHIN S. -
MEGHIR G. (2000) and VISCUSI K. (1986) empirically establish a negative correlation
between earnings levels (or wage rates) and criminal activity. The relationship
between crime and unemployment has been more tenuous (see CHIRICOS T., 1987)
or FREEMAN R. (1983; 1995) for excellent surveys); however, a number of recentThe key difficulty in estimating the effect of education on crim-
inal activity is that unobserved characteristics affecting schooling
decisions are likely to be correlated with unobservables influencing
the decision to engage in crime. For example, individuals with high
discount rates or high returns to criminal activity are likely to spend
more time on crime rather than work, regardless of their educa-
tional background. To the extent that schooling does not raise crim-
inal returns, there is little reward to finishing high school or at-
tending college for these individuals. As a result, we might expect a
negative correlation between crime and education even if there is
no causal effect of education on crime. State policies may induce
bias with the opposite sign - if increases in state spending for crime
prevention and prison construction trade off with spending for pub-
lic education, a positive spurious correlation between education
and crime is also possible.
In a recent paper, Lochner and Moretti (2002) analyze the
effect of schooling on incarceration, arrests and self-reported
criminal activity using changes in state compulsory school
attendance laws as an instrument for schooling. Changes in these
laws have a significant effect on educational achievement, and the
authors reject tests for reverse causality. Moreover, increases in
compulsory schooling ages do not appear to be correlated with
increases in state resources devoted to fighting crime. Both OLS
and IV estimates agree and suggest that additional years of
secondary schooling reduce the probability of incarceration with
the greatest impact associated with completing high school.
Differences in educational attainment between black and white
men can explain as much as 23% of the black-white gap in male
incarceration rates. Education has the largest impact on the
prevention of murder, assault, and motor vehicle theft. Lochner
and Moretti also find evidence that the estimates for imprisonment
and arrest are caused by changes in criminal behavior and not
educational differences in the probability of arrest or incarceration
conditional on crime.
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studies that better address problems with endogeneity and unobserved correlates
(including GOULD E. et AL., 2000 and RAPHAEL S. - WINTER-EBMER R., 2001) find a
sizeable positive effect of unemployment on crime.If these results are correct, cities with higher high school
graduation rates should have lower crime rates, holding everything
else constant. The social savings from crime reduction associated
with high school graduation rates appear to be economically
important. The externality is about 14-26% of the private return,
suggesting that a significant part of the social return to completing
high school comes in the form of externalities from crime
reduction.
Political Economy Effects
Many economists have argued that education provides social
benefits through enhanced political behavior. Among many other
authors, Hanushek (2002), makes this argument in his survey of
public education. Interestingly, the argument that education
generates externalities by improving the political behavior of
voters resonates both with noted advocates of a limited role for
government — such as Adam Smith and Milton Friedman — as
well as with liberal proponents of a larger role of government in
the economy. For example, Friedman (1962) argues that:
16
«A stable and democratic society is impossible without a
minimum degree of literacy and knowledge on the part of most
citizens and without widespread acceptance of some common set of
values. Education can contribute to both. In consequence, the gain
from education of a child accrues not only to the child or to his
parents but also to other members of the society. The education of
my child contributes to your welfare by promoting a stable and
democratic society. There is therefore a significant “neighborhood
effect”. [...] Most of us would probably conclude that the gains are
suciently important to justify some government subsidy».
Why might education affect political behavior? First, and most
Private and Social Returns to Education E. MORETTI
39
16 Even earlier, SMITH A. (1776) emphasized the benefits of increased cognitive
capacity among the common people, claiming that: they are more disposed to
examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction
and sedition, and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton
or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government.importantly, more educated voters may have more information on
candidates’ and political parties’ positions. The fact that better-
educated citizens are likely to be more informed voters may be
due to active accumulation of information during campaigns
(higher newspaper readership, for example), or to a better ability
to process a given amount of information (if, for example,
education improves cognitive skills). According to this argument,
better-educated citizens are in a position to make more informed
choices at election time. By choosing better candidates, they create
an externality that may benefit all citizens. A second channel
through which education might affect political behavior is if
education increases civic participation, for example, by raising
voter turn-out rates. If increased civic participation improves
social decision-making, then education may also affect the quality
of political decisions.
17 If enhanced political behavior produces
social benefits, then Pigouvian subsidies for education may
produce more efficient education acquisition decisions.
A vast body of empirical research in political science focuses
on civic participation.
18 The key weakness of the existing evidence
lies in the treatment of causality. Since both education acquisition
and civic participation are choices made by individuals, these
decisions might be jointly caused by some excluded individual
characteristic. Lacking a strategy to address this possibility, the
available literature offers little firm evidence on the causal nature
of the relationship.
Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) are the first to address
the potential endogeneity of schooling in this literature, although
the exclusion restrictions they impose on their estimation are not
convincing. More recently, Dee (2002) and Milligan, Moretti &
Oreopoulos (2003) use an instrumental variables strategy based
on changes in compulsory schooling laws to account for
endogeneity. Milligan et al. (2003) find a strong effect of education
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17 Different models have been proposed in which increased civic participation
lead to better outcomes. See for example OSBORNE M.J. - ROSENTHAL J.S. - TURNER
M.A. (2000) and FEDDERSEN T.J. - PESENDORFER W. (1996).
18 See VERBA S. - NIE N.H. (1972); TEIXEIRA R.A. (1987); HELLIWELL J. - PUTNAM
J. (1999); POWELL G. JR. (1985); LEIGHLEY J.E. - NAGLER J. (1992) and WEISBERG
H.F. - BOX-STEFFENSMEIER J.M. (1999).on voting in the US. The effect appears to stem from differences
in voter registration across education groups. Results from the
UK, where citizens are legally responsible and actively assisted to
register, show no effect of education on voting. They also find
strong and persistent effects of education on civic behavior in both
the US and the UK. Educated adults are more likely to discuss
politics with others, associate with a political group, work on
community issues, and follow election campaigns in the media.
Other Efficiency-Based Motivations for Public Subsidies
There are other possible efficiency-based motivations for
public subsidies to schooling. Credit constraints are an important
possible motivation. As pointed out by Gary Becker in his classic
volume, Human Capital, the capital market for college investments
is likely to be imperfect. Potential college entrants have little
collateral to provide to investors. And, as a result, without
contracts allowing for indentured labor, there is no way for lenders
to force college graduates to earn up to their potential. Families
are likely to be in the best position to do so (although as any
parent would testify, even their points of leverage are limited).
Those with greater family resources are likely to have the greatest
access to such capital. However, given the prominent role that
borrowing constraints play in the rationale for public intervention,
the lack of a definitive evidence of the importance of borrowing
constraints remains a large gap in the literature.
Another possible efficiency-based rational for government
intervention in higher education is represented by intergenerational
externalities. It is in theory possible that increases in the level of
schooling of parents benefit their children. For example, some
studies report a correlation between maternal education and
measures of child health (Currie and Moretti, 2003). If higher
maternal education does indeed improve child health outcomes,
then conventional estimates of the returns to education which focus
only on wages may understate the social benefits. Moreover, to the
extent that healthier children go on to be more productive and more
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inter-generational spillover that analysis of wage effects alone will
not capture.
It is possible, and indeed likely, that some of these inter-
generational effects are private in nature, or at least private to
the family, and thus are taken into account by individuals choos-
ing the optimal amount of schooling. This would be the case if
parents are altruistic, and care about their offspring. If so, these
intergenerational effects do not constitute a rational for public
intervention. On the other hand, it is possible that the private
component of the benefit is only a part of the total benefit. For
example, parents may be altruistic, but may not care about the
well being of their descendants with the same intensity as their
descendants do.
Oreopolous et al. (2004) and Balck and Devereux (2004) use
an instrumental variable strategy to document the how exogenous
increases in the schooling level of parents translate into increases
in the schooling level of children. Currie and Moretti (2003),
examine the effect of maternal education on birth outcomes using
birth certificate data for 1970 to 1999. They find that higher
maternal education improves infant health, as measured by birth
weight and gestational age. It also increases the probability that
a new mother is married, reduces parity, increases use of prenatal
care, and reduces smoking, suggesting that may be important
pathways for the ultimate effect on health. These results add to
the body of literature which suggests that estimates of the returns
to education which focus only on increases in wages understate
the total return.
Overall, the weight of the evidence seems to indicate that
increases in human capital of the current generation result in non-
trivial intergenerational benefit. While some of these benefits may
be private in nature, it is reasonable to expect that at least some
are externalities.
It is possible that the risk associated with human capital
investment is non-diversifiable. The inability to diversify risk is
another way in which human capital investment is different from
physical capital investment, and may provide a justification for
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MAGGIO-GIUGNO 2006
42public intervention. An individual choosing to invest in a college
education to become a nurse cannot easily diversify the risk
associated with this occupation by selling claims on future income
and purchasing clams on the future income stream of alternative
occupations. Under this scenario, it might make sense for
individual to share risk. Public expenditures on higher education,
financed by progressive taxation, can be interpreted as a form of
ex-post insurance, or a way of risk diversification. The key for this
risk sharing to work is of course the progressivity of the public
education system.
5. - Conclusion
What is the effect of an increase in the aggregate level of human
capital on an economy? Although much is known about the private
returns to human capital, the answer to this question is not
straightforward. Increases in the skill level of an area can affect the
local economy in ways that are not fully reflected in the private
return of education. Human capital spillovers can in theory increase
productivity over and above the direct effect of human capital on
individual productivity. Furthermore, increases in education can
reduce criminal participation and improve voters’ political behavior.
The empirical literature provides some intriguing evidence on
the existence of human capital externalities. However, there is still
no consensus on the exact magnitude of such externalities. The
main reason is that the empirical literature on the subject is still
very young and the econometric challenges are dicult to overcome.
Given the enormous policy implications, more work is clearly
needed on this topic.
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